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ABSTRACT
Regionalization in East Asia has drastically arisen the past two decades. Other 
than economic coordination, competition of regional leadership has been steering 
the direction of regional integration. In terms of ϐinance, East Asian states have 
also established the Chiang Mai Initiative for regional monetary cooperation. In 
the trade sphere, free trade agreements have mushroomed after the millennium. 
In particular, special emphasis is given to the competition between Japan and 
China as this is considered as one of the main forces to push the regionalization 
drive forward. By comparing Japan and China’s regional policy, this paper seeks 
to opens possibilities about the path, motivations and future opportunities for 
East Asian integration through a qualitative synthesis of opinion from experts, 
requirement from authorities and existing studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
East Asian regionalism has been one of 
the most signiϐicant cases of global economic 
integration in the past few years. The “East Asian 
Community” had been the regional consensus 
in 2007. The ASEAN Economic Community was 
expected to be established by 2015. The China-
Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement is still 
undergoing negotiation, in spite of unsolved 
territorial disputes. Without reverse waves, there 
would be no doubt that East Asia will be the 
single biggest economic block in the world in the 
near future. Foreseeing this, some experts start 
to deliver warnings of East Asian regionalism. 
Functional integration in the regional level is still 
underdeveloped. Geographical diversity, state 
sizes, and political rivalry remain an obstacle for 
robust institutional capacity (Ravenhill, 2009). 
The core functions of regionalism, trade and 
ϐinance are not ready to compete with Europe and 
North America. Apparently, it is time to scrutinize 
the progress and development of East Asian 
regionalism. 
Since the Asian Financial Crisis, East Asian 
countries started to recognize the necessity for 
regional economic coordination. The next decade, 
East Asian countries reached diverse progress 
regarding ϐinancial coordination and free trade 
negotiations. On ϐinance, the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI) is considered as a milestone of regional 
monetary cooperation. In the trade sphere, free 
trade agreements (FTAs) also ϐlourished after 
the millennium. FTAs and ϐinancial coordination 
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are derivative phenomena of globalization. By 
May 2003, over 265 FTAs were reported to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) wherein 138 
FTAs were governed under WTO in January 
1995. Over 190 are currently in force; another 
60 are believed to be operational although not 
yet reported. However, in East Asia, diffusion 
of FTAs is relatively lagged. In November 2001, 
China and ASEAN leaders agreed to establish a 
China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA). In 2005, 
Japan followed suit to reach similar agreements 
with ASEAN countries. The 1997 Financial Crisis 
has proven to be a turning point for regionalism 
in Asia. But there are limited explanations on 
why East Asian countries are late in the pursuit 
of regional integration, and on what motivations 
are necessary for East Asian countries to pursue 
cross-border ϐinancial coordination, and trade 
negotiations. 
Higgott (1998) astutely observed the 
Asian Financial Crisis and said “the political 
manifestations of these events (the ϐinancial 
crises) will linger long after the necessary reforms 
have been introduced to return at least a semblance 
of economic normalcy to the region.” There might 
be two meaning of Higgott’s argument. Firstly, 
new regional institutional arrangements have 
to be established in wake of critical juncture. As 
the crisis has become the catalyst of ϐinancial and 
trade reform, exogenous impact may inϐluence 
the logic of regional response. Secondly, as the 
Crisis is also political, regional countries will seek 
ϐinancial and trade policies based on different 
motivations and perceptions of existing situation. 
This perspective could be seen from sub-regional 
trade agreements being busily negotiated by 
Japan, South Korea, Singapore and other countries 
in East Asia. Alternatively, national responses 
could also be analyzed to discern the logic in 
disseminating ϐinancial and trade knowledge. 
This paper aims to discuss probable answers 
to the core questions of national response to 
regionalism, and how these factors may inϐluence 
the path to East Asian integration, focusing on a 
comparison of Japan and China’s political economy 
as competition between these two countries is a 
probable catalyst for increased regionalization. We 
will see how cross-border ϐinancial coordination 
and FTA policies disseminate, how national 
governments understand regionalization, and 
how idea and motivations contribute in adopting 
speciϐic FTA policies. In Section II of the study, 
regionalization and FTA policy diffusion in East 
Asia are summarized. Two hypotheses of policy 
diffusion and a multidimensional deϐinition of 
competition are presented. The Asian Financial 
Crisis will also be discussed as it served as the 
critical juncture for East Asian countries to 
recognize the importance of regional coordination 
in the ϐinancial sphere. Section III is dedicated to 
illustrating the way regional countries attempt 
to imitate the IMF arrangements and receive 
limited success in spite of their efforts. Section 
IV delves deeper and focuses on Japan and China 
by comparing their economic, political, and legal 
motivations in pursuit of FTAs. Section V concludes 
this article by consolidating information on how 
the diffusion and dissemination of ϐinancial 
and FTA policies possibly results in closer 
regionalization. It also reviews the competition 
for regional leadership between Japan and China, 
and the implications of this competition on further 
regionalization in East Asia.
II. THE EAST ASIAN PATTERN OF REGIONAL 
LEADERSHIP AND FTA POLICY DIFFUSION
Before the Asian Financial Crisis, the 
dissemination of FTA and ϐinancial collaboration 
in East Asia is lagged behind the progress of EU 
and NAFTA. Yet, the ϐinancial crisis provoked great 
sense of regional consciousness. As argued by 
Acharya, regional countries started to recognize 
the necessity to strengthen regional organization 
in the wake of the Crisis (Acharya, 2004). Simmons, 
Dobbin and Garrett (2007) argued that one reason 
that could explain the rise of regional sense is the 
economic imperative of regional powers to keep 
competition. In order to keep regional economy 
aϐloat, regional powers would shoulder the role 
of stabilizing order and cooperate with regional 
countries to reshufϐle existing organizations. In 
the 1990s, East Asian regional countries engaged 
in collective pursuit of economic liberalization. 
Whether resisted or accepted, regional countries 
accelerated domestic economic reform and 
deregulated ϐinancial market. During this process, 
regional powers were considered referral to 
legitimize domestic reform (Dobbin, Simmons 
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& Garrett, 2007) . The emulation process 
triggered a series of policy diffusion. Hall (1993) 
indicated  that the regional policy paradigms may 
incrementally forge and offer cognitive maps to 
inϐluence policymakers by “a framework of ideas 
and standards that speciϐies not only the goals of 
policy and the kind of instruments, but also the 
very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing.” Further, the universe of knowledge of 
regionalization would have signiϐicantly clout an 
idea. The process of greater regional integration 
on multilayer agendas, for instance, Acharya 
emphasized that the regionalist discourses 
would eventually develop and in turn reshape 
the process of region building (Acharya, 1997). 
Katzenstrein and Okawara (1993) have come to 
conclude similarly, pertaining to national security.
Apparently, diffusion of policies takes 
place when regional powers’ actions generate 
externalities for others. Simmons, Dobbin and 
Garret further contended that, in trade and 
ϐinancial market, rival regional powers’ policies 
that attract international capital would compel 
others to follow suit as well. It follows that the 
international competition may make regional 
powers pursue regional policy in similar ways 
(Simmons, Dobbin & Garret, 2006).
It is worthy to know the epidemic effects of 
regional powers’ policy.  According to MacIntyre, 
Pempel and Ravenhill (2008), Southeast Asian 
countries emulated Japan after the Asian Financial 
Crisis, for policy innovation in adopting regional 
standards in order to effectively enhance the 
attractiveness of domestic markets. Generally, 
according to Dent (2008), regional powers 
competing for leadership come with certain 
behavior and beneϐits. Firstly, regional leadership 
has to provide public goods that include a 
stable and secured environment, sustainable 
development, and reduction of the region’s poverty 
levels. Secondly, regional leadership has to resolve 
collective action problems. When negotiating 
regional integration regulations, regional 
leadership has to communicate between groups 
of states and manage agenda in order to make 
all member states compromise on agreements. 
Beyond the two roles, regional leadership also has 
to lead the regional community-building process 
and champion the interests of the regional 
community in the global level. 
Collective policy adoption in the regional 
level is based on the efforts of regional leadership. 
The most conspicuous sectors are ϐinancial 
coordination and FTA policies. When regional 
leaders start to initiate cross-national policy 
networks that are crucial to disseminate policy 
knowledge, governments are committed to engage 
in negotiating as many preferential ϐinancial 
and trade agreements as possible with little 
concern about sequencing. Governments also 
take a homogeneous position through recognizing 
international standard rules that closely mirror 
those of reference countries. 
Currently, students of East Asian study 
mostly agree that regional leadership primarily 
concentrates on the ‘national-level’ activities 
of China and Japan. Through constellation of 
governmental agencies of either Japan or China, 
researches indicate that domestic politics 
play a key part in determining the outlooks of 
what both Japan and China have on regional or 
international leadership issues. From a macro 
perspective, other than Japan and China, there 
are also relevant actors in different policy areas. 
Of course, the prospect for regional leadership 
in East Asia is more complex than what has been 
mentioned above. Extra-regional actors, including 
U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and India sometimes 
complicate analyses on speciϐic issues. It is also 
possible that a regional leadership structure 
based on China and Japan may not be desirable 
for the regional collective as a whole, because 
regional states incrementally voice their demands 
in the global and extra-regional levels and have 
anticipated less on regional collectives. 
Concerning ϐinancial and trade integration, 
regional countries act differently as they take 
a realist perspective. Domestic politics is 
still the key of regional policy. Preferences of 
bureaucrats play an important role on regional 
policy. Business and economic bureaucrats are 
concerned with investment and trade diversion. 
Politicians and diplomats focus on the notions of 
international ϐinance and trade policies. In order 
to maximize relative/competitive advantage in 
the ϐinancial and trade area, countries adopt 
ϐinancial and trade policies selectively with 
special attention to counterpart choices, market 
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access commitments, and rule-making in FTAs 
which should be beneϐicial in creating national 
competitive advantage. Governments also take 
a “heterogeneous position to quest FTAs with a 
distinct package of investment and trade rules. 
In the initial stage of regional integration, 
countries may perceive lenient pressure of 
ϐinancial and trade competition and rarely rank 
regionalization on the top of policy making 
list. The main motivations for countries to 
adopt ϐinancial and trade policies with special 
orientation for greater regional participation 
are generally related to the appeals of business 
and economic bureaucrats. As the process of 
regionalization intensiϐies, a higher degree of rule-
making is realized, countries perceive competitive 
pressure and strategically position themselves in 
the regional ϐinance and trade blocs. 
This article may not provide a clear picture for 
the development of East Asian regional leadership. 
A possible speculation, the development of 
ϐinancial and trade market, still has to be based on 
evidence in exercising regional leadership in East 
Asia. In a broad sense, Japan would continue to 
play an indirect role in cooperating with ASEAN 
countries based on its ofϐicial development aids 
and economic power. China would cash on its rise 
of political and economic strengths and declare 
the leadership in a more assertive way. In addition, 
China should also prefer a regional framework 
that excludes the inϐluence of extra-regional 
power, especially U.S. and India. The deϐinition 
of regional membership would continuously be 
a central arena for Japan and China to struggle 
on. The different nature of Japan and China’s 
regional approaches to lead may sometimes make 
it awkward to compare the two countries. Yet, it 
would make more sense to work on individual 
cases before jumping into a general theory or 
model. 
III. REGIONAL FINANCIAL INITIATIVES
The East Asian ϐinancial crisis of 1997-1998 
provides several valuable lessons for East Asian 
regional integration. Many economic, academic 
and government policy makers saw the Asian 
Financial Crisis as a wake-up call to libertarian 
market policy. Governments in this region were 
incapable to govern global capital ϐlow and fend 
off vicious attacks of speculators. The ϐinancial 
institutions had to reform. The capital market 
had to be supervised and regulated following the 
international standards (Wang, 2003). Except 
China and Japan, the Asian Financial Crisis 
demonstrated vulnerability of small and open 
emerging markets (Manupipatpong, 2002). Early 
in 1995, a number of economists began to warn 
Southeast Asian countries about the possibility 
of suffering a Latin American style of ϐinancial 
crisis. In 1996, IMF and World Bank also delivered 
alert to the governments of Thailand, Malaysia, 
and other countries about the risk of respective 
ϐinancial markets. However, these warnings were 
generally snubbed (Krugman, 1998). 
After export slowdown occurred in 1997, 
the real estate that bubbled in Thailand soon 
collapsed. On July 2, Thailand gave in to the 
pressures and ϐloated the baht. Then, a series 
of currency speculation against other regional 
countries followed. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines were all hit in the ϐirst wave (Krugman, 
1998). 
Without precedent experience of 
international ϐinance coordination, Southeast 
Asian countries had meager institutional 
support to act collectively. The slack institutional 
arrangements of Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) were proven incapable 
to lead regional countries in ϐighting against 
ϐinancial catastrophe (Suh, 2002). Some regional 
organizations were introduced and established 
in the 1990, including the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement for trade liberalization, APEC, ASEM, 
and the Manila Framework Group. But none had 
ever reached high levels of institutionalization of 
the ϐinancial sector (Goto, 2002). The Asia Paciϐic 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), established in 
1989, was considered promising to reach sensible 
solution for Southeast Asian countries. Under the 
institutional design of multilateral framework 
and strong inϐluence from the U.S., APEC did not 
deliver a solid package for ϐinancial rescue.  
Japanese Finance Minister Hirishi Mitsuzuka 
proposed to establish an Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF) that would provide sufϐicient liquidity 
(emergency capital) which could quickly mobilize 
a country in urgent need of foreign currency 
to forestall speculative attacks on the region’s 
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currencies and to institutionalize ϐinancial 
cooperation in the region. The Japanese proposal 
was considered as an institutional innovation to 
imitate the IMF framework with the possibility 
of exchange rate coordination which is similar 
to European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
(Castellano, 2000; Chalongphob, 2000). Many 
Southeast Asian countries strongly supported 
this proposal. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad tabled the AMF initiative again at the 
Asian Summit in the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) held in Singapore, with expectation that 
AMF was established as an East Asian monetary 
cooperation mechanism. The AMF received mixed 
reactions, however. While most countries in East 
Asia welcomed a regional ϐinance cooperation 
mechanism, U.S., EU and IMF, on the other hand, 
seriously opposed on the grounds that it would 
threaten the stability of the global ϐinancial 
system, by weakening the IMF’s voice in promoting 
structural adjustments in recipient countries and 
by aggravating a serious moral hazard problem. 
Consequently, the AMF proposal was turned down 
at the Fifth Asia Paciϐic Economic Cooperation 
Meeting (APEC) in Manila (Park & Wang, 2003).
In 1998, the second ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT) Summit was held in Hanoi, Vietnam. China 
proposed establishing the APT Finance Ministers 
Deputies Meeting (FMDM), the ϐirst convention 
occurred in March 1999, and then the ϐirst Finance 
Ministers Meeting (FMM) in the following month 
held with the ADB Annual Meeting in Manila. 
The third APT Summit held in November 1999 at 
Manila marked a watershed in the development 
of ϐinancial regionalism in Asia. Besides the 
“Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation,” China 
insisted on the signiϐicance of strengthening 
the APT ϐinancial process. The Chinese proposal 
was supported by other participants and was 
agreed to regularize the APT’s FMM arrangement 
(Hamanaka, 20085).
Following the discussion among high rank 
ϐinancial ofϐicials of APT countries, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) was agreed at the second APT FMM 
held in May 2000 in Chiang Main, Thailand. At the 
core of the CMI arrangement was a region-wide 
system of bilateral currency swap arrangements 
among APT countries. It comprised a series of 
new regional economic surveillance and policy 
dialogue mechanism. In October 1998 the Japanese 
government proposed a framework called “A New 
Initiative to Overcome the Asian Currency Crisis,” 
also known as the New Miyazawa Initiative (NMI), 
aimed at providing a package of ϐinancial support 
totaling US$30 billion. In fact, there was a demand 
for such funding from Asian countries in order to 
support corporate debt restructuring, strengthen 
social safety nets, stimulate the economy, and 
address the credit crunch. The United States 
and the IMF supported this initiative, owing to 
its bilateral nature, compared with the previous 
proposal that attempted to achieve cooperation 
on a multilateral basis. 
Under the NMI scheme, Japan signed bilateral 
CSAs with South Korea and Malaysia in January 
and July 1999. CSAs were integrated in CMI by 
expanding the existing ASEAN Swap Arrangement 
(ASA) to include all ASEAN countries and a network 
of bilateral swap and repurchase agreement 
facilities among ASEAN countries, China, Japan 
and South Korea as a “ϐirewall” against future 
ϐinancial crises (Wang & Woo, 2002). CMI did 
not only promote the exchange of consistent and 
timely data and information on capital ϐlows, it 
also established a system of pooled reserves that 
central banks could draw upon to buy time when 
their currencies come under speculative attack 
(Lin & Rajan, 2001). An early warning system was 
established to enhance the ability in providing 
sufϐicient and timely ϐinancial stability.
Table 1
Bilateral swap arrangements under CMI (as of 
October 2002) 
Currencies Maximum drawing
Japan & China Yen-yuan reminbi US$ 3.0 billion equivalent
Japan&S. Korea US dollar-won US$ 7.0 billion*
Japan & Singapore US dollar-Singapore dollar Under negotiation
China & Malaysia US dollar-ringgit US$ 1.5 billion
China & S. Korea Yuan renminbi-won US$ 2.0 billion equialent
S. Korea & Philippines US dollar-peso Under negotiation
S. Korea & Thailand US dollar-baht US$ 1.0 billion
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan, 28 Mar 2002, and other country-
speciϐic webpages. 
*Including a dollar-won swap arrangement of US$ 5 billion and a dollar-
ringgit swap arrangement of US$ 2.5 billion from the New Miyazawa Initiative.
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Beyond CMI efforts, signiϐicant progress was 
proceeding as well. The ASEAN Task Force on 
“ASEAN currency and Exchange Rate Mechanism” 
was established in March 2001. Additional 
impetus to this work was supported by the Kobe 
Research Project, which was an initiative of 
consultation mechanism comprising of the Asia-
Europe Finance Ministers group. Under the Kobe 
Research Project a large number of studies were 
contributed by institutions and individual experts 
in Asia and Europe to further enhance monetary 
and ϐinancial cooperation (Rana, 2002). 
By September 2005, the CMI system operated 
on a US$54.5 billion total, and by May 2007 this 
had risen to US$82.5 billion based on 16 bilateral 
agreements. Originally, as series of bilateral 
currency swap agreements among regional 
ϐinancial authorities, in broad terms, the CMI is a 
type of an expansion of ASA, aimed at providing 
countries facing the possibility of a liquidity 
shortage with additional short-term hard 
currencies. It encompasses all ASEAN countries, 
as well as China, Japan and Korea. This expansion 
of the ASA is the ϐirst step to put CMI effective. The 
CMI appeared to have been well received by IMF 
and U.S. At a press conference by Horst Kohler 
in Prague (September 20, 2000; Hamanaka, 
2008), the new IMF Managing Director expressed 
support for AMF and other regional initiatives 
as long as they were complementary and not 
competitive with the IMF approach (Ross, 2001; 
Benassy-Quere, 1999). 
IV. A COMPARISON OF JAPAN AND CHINA’S 
TRADE POLICIES AND MOTIVATIONS IN 
PURSUIT OF FTAS
East Asian countries were latecomers of free 
trade policies. When regionalism re-emerged as a 
preferred economic policy in the 1980s and 1990s, 
East Asian countries were relatively lagged behind 
in terms of formal political institutionalization 
of regional organizations. Political rivalry and 
security concerned between China and Japan 
are telling factors which delayed the progress in 
diffusing regional trade policies. After the Asian 
Financial Crisis, China moved actively to embrace 
regionalism and subsequently stimulated Japan 
to accelerate bilateral negotiations on economic 
partnership agreements. In the ϐirst decade 
of the millennium, the FTA boom became the 
conspicuous phenomena in East Asia. Motivations 
behind the scene of China and Japan’s pursuit 
in FTA negotiations are more political and legal 
than economic. Therefore, the logic to adopt 
FTA policies closely follows the competition 
hypothesis. 
As for economic motivation, both China and 
Japan have different interests in pursuing FTAs. It 
is generally believed that China’s rapid growth of 
exports is based on their plenty and cheap labor 
resource. FTAs are most effective in lowering 
tariffs and substantially reducing the costs of both 
exports and imports. For China’s old-fashioned 
command enterprises, FTAs are considered 
to be a chance of enhancing the efϐiciency and 
productivity. China also attempted to use FTAs 
to make good use of ROOs. Even though WTO is 
not a shield for China to avoid impacts of ROOs on 
its vital exports, China can win better deals when 
negotiating ROOs based on its market power. 
Japan has a very different economic interest 
from China, however. Since the 1980s, Japanese 
business already extended their reach to Asian 
markets. Export was considered as the “life line” 
of Japanese economy. FTAs were deemed essential 
to maintain the competitive presence of Japanese 
multinationals in the region. The past decade, 
Japan diverted attention to bilateral FTAs with 
the largest ASEAN countries (Pekkanen, 2005). 
FTAs are important vehicles that facilitate Japan 
to build production networks and regional export 
platforms in ASEAN countries and to keep up with 
the competition from Chinese products. As China 
incrementally transforme itself from the “world 
factory” to the “world market,” the Japanese 
business community also began to demand 
preferential trade negotiations with its largest 
trading partners, say China, U.S., and EU. 
If we consider China as another candidate 
in competing for regional leadership, China’s 
political logic in seeking FTAs is no less important 
than the economic one. As a major power, China’s 
FTA strategy needs to serve the political goals in 
order to enhance its inϐluence in the international 
political economy and expand its political and 
security space. Therefore, China makes FTAs 
an important tool for both economic as well as 
political diplomacy. For example, China signed 
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bilateral preferential agreements with Taiwan 
and Hong Kong based on the concept of Greater 
China Circle. China is also wary of Japan’s effort in 
negotiating FTAs with its neighbors and imperative 
to reach key FTAs with ASEAN to break up the 
encirclement of Japan’s FTA strategy. Japan’s FTA 
policy is inϐluenced by its diplomatic concern 
over the U.S. alliance, and security concern about 
China’s rise in this region. As the U.S. wielded two 
wars in the Middle East, U.S. put gravity of Asia 
policy away from Japan. Therefore, Japan argues 
that U.S. should negotiate bilateral FTAs as the 
most effective economic means to strengthen 
the US-Japan alliance. On the other hand, Japan 
is engaged in the race for regional leadership 
since the Asian Financial Crisis. Further, national 
leaders of both countries perceived great pressure 
on domestic nationalism. Japan gradually deϐines 
China as a potential threat. Therefore, the initiative 
of former Prime Minister Hatoyama to form the 
“East Asian Community” could be considered as 
a policy innovation in striking the right balance 
with China. 
Related to economic and political motivations, 
both China and Japan recognized the central 
importance of rule making in the multilateral 
framework. China has held a view that the 
existing international economic order is unfair 
and biased toward U.S. and EU. The concept of 
“harmonious world” also advocates a fair and 
rational international order. In G20 and WTO, 
China was always outspoken and opposed any 
linkage between trade and labor standards, 
and the use of environmental standards which 
limit China’s rights of economic growth. Japan, 
however, has abandoned its previous attachment 
on a consensual approach for regional trade 
agreements like APEC. Japan’s competitive legal 
strategy aimed to amend WTO provisions was 
deemed harmful to Japanese corporate interests. 
Both the Japanese government and business 
groups are also dissatisϐied with multilateral 
antidumping code which is deemed by Japanese 
business as discriminatory treatment against 
Japanese business. Therefore, Japanese business 
interests identiϐied FTAs as an opportunity to 
reform antidumping practices. Japan’s legal 
competitive strategy has created an FTA approach 
different from both NAFTA and the Chinese trade 
agreements. Japan’s FTAs are more comprehensive 
in terms of issue scope and legalistic than Chinese 
FTAs, which are considered as brief and vague 
without formal dispute settlement mechanism. 
In FTA negotiations with ASEAN, Japan was more 
skillful in luring East Asia by offering agricultural 
concessions through the Early Harvest Program 
when establishing its cross-border FTA networks. 
V. CONCLUSION
The diffusion and dissemination of ϐinancial 
and FTA policies in East Asian countries resulted 
in closer integration in the regional level. 
Differences in the stages of FTA development 
and environment make governments adopt 
policies through strategic calculation. As to the 
ϐinancial coordination in East Asia, institutional 
slackness of ASEAN way and political rivalry of 
major powers hesitate East Asian countries to 
establish complicated and capable institutional 
arrangements for cross-border ϐinancial 
coordination and supervision. In the critical 
juncture of the Asian Financial Crisis, East Asian 
countries proposed to imitate institutional design 
of IMF for regional countries to cooperate on 
monetary sphere. The AMF proposal invited 
opposition from U.S., EU and IMF for fear of  the 
threatening stability of the global ϐinancial system. 
Japan, China and ASEAN countries compromised 
to create CMI by expanding the existing ASEAN 
Swap Arrangement as a ϐirewall against future 
ϐinancial crisis. Diffusion of FTAs is a different story 
which is different from cross-border ϐinancial 
coordination. Since the late 1980s, Japanese 
multinationals and economic bureaucrats were 
considered as a strong lobby in promoting trade 
policy. In the post-Cold War period, Japan and 
Australia cooperated in establishing a regional 
trade bloc emulating the EU counterpart. Conϐined 
by regional environment, multilateral framework 
of APEC fails to copy the EU model. Instead, as 
different motivations, strategic calculation, and 
political rivalry will make APEC like talking shop 
(Ashiawa, 2004). Eventually China and Japan 
decided to seek FTAs through bilateral negotiation. 
On the late stage of FTA adoption, competition is 
the main driving force. Economic, political, and 
legal motivations are diverse between China and 
Japan. By juxtaposing China and Japan together, 
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FTA preference and pattern can be clearly 
discerned. 
For large countries, such as China and Japan, 
the motivation for FTA policies includes both 
economic and noneconomic goals. China’s choice 
of FTA partners is based on the strategic calculation 
that China could extend its space in international 
market. Japan provides being another case where 
politics is clearly relevant but market access, 
particularly being shut out of existing markets for 
Japanese industries, is also an important concern. 
At the same time, the Japanese governments is 
preoccupied with the country’s uncompetitive 
domestic sectors, particularly agriculture, so that 
it cannot engage in FTAs with countries such as 
China and U.S. Pressures in political and legal 
competition are particularly central reasons for 
large states to engage in FTAs. China’s increasingly 
active pursuit of FTAs both in East Asia and in Latin 
America has pressured the U.S. The dissemination 
of their own models of economic integration 
is also important for the large countries. The 
rivalry between Japan and China has pushed 
these two countries into active FTA negotiations 
within the Asian region, since both want not only 
to demonstrate their trade leadership but also 
to establish their own model of FTA standards. 
China offers a non-legalistic FTA model that 
features selective liberalization without clauses 
on issues like environment and labor standards. 
Japanese FTAs, named as Economic Partnership 
Agreements or EPAs, contrarily promote WTO-
plus provisions including rules on investment and 
intellectual property. 
Other perspectives could be explored to see 
how Japan and China extend regional leadership 
competition. Both countries possess their own 
particular kind of soft power resources, saying 
public diplomacy, ideas and norms, or other 
means. Recent years, soft power analysis already 
offered a different perspective from traditional 
approaches in studying leadership (Cohen & Chiu, 
2013). Japan’s limited success of translating its 
soft power into hard power and China’s failure 
in containing Vietnam implicate the conspicuous 
limit of soft power in real politics. From the 
ideological perspective, regional leadership may 
enjoy soft power advantage to inϐluence regional 
states and shape the agenda. Yet, the limited 
success of soft power in East Asia suggests both 
Japan and China have to be more serious about 
soft power. 
In the post-crisis period, there has been a 
signiϐicant change in the thinking of East Asian 
policymakers in developing a new regional 
ϐinancial and trade architecture by promoting 
self-help efforts. In this context the establishment 
of various regional organizations, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative and bilateral trade negotiations are 
efforts being made to expand regional integration. 
Yet, “political will” has to be developed for more 
concerted actions. 
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